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How can higher and professional education contribute to the development of 
responsible citizenship and professional responsibility? In recent discussions on 
the role of the educational system, the idea of “deliberative communication” 
has been brought into focus and stands for communication in which different 
opinions and values can be set against each other in educational settings. It 
implies an endeavour by each individual to develop his or her view by listening, 
deliberating, seeking arguments and valuing, coupled to a collective and coop-
erative endeavour to find values and norms which everyone can accept, at the 
same time as pluralism is acknowledged. Within higher education deliberative 
communication might explicitly be used to develop professional responsibility 
and analysing consequences of different ways of solving problems. To what 
extent are and can universities become public spaces for encounters dealing 
with controversial questions of how to solve different problems and analyse 
different ways of professional acting? Can universities recreate their selective 
traditions, “institutionalize dissensus”, and “make the university a site of 
public debate” through deliberative communication?
Keywords: professional responsibility, citizenship rights, deliberative 
communication. 
Towards responsible citizenship and professional 
responsibility
Progress towards deliberative democracy requires citizens with well-
established deliberative attitudes, and a society that rests on the ideas of 
deliberative democracy is a long-term project – “democratic deliberation 98
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requires equal opportunity of access to political influence” (Knight & 
Johnson 1997, p. 280). This implies that certain institutions are given a 
central role, and the educational system is perhaps the institution with 
the greatest potential in such a long-term project, in that it can create 
the preconditions for developing deliberative capacities. One of the long-
term ends-in-view to be achieved by giving deliberative communication 
a prominent place is that of developing the democratic role of different 
parts of the educational system: “In any effort to make democracy more 
deliberative, the single most important institution outside government 
is the educational system” (Gutmann & Thompson 1996, p. 359).1
Is it possible and desirable, then, to see institutions of higher 
education (colleges and universities), too, as strategic sites for creating 
opportunities for democratic deliberation? In a historical perspective, 
the university has not had a role of educating for democracy. There 
are of course some exceptions, like the University of Chicago in the 
late 1890s and subsequently. The education of professionals in higher 
education institutions – “the professional complex” as it was called 
by one of its central architects, Parsons 1968 – can be seen as a focal 
point for the different interests and social forces behind the role of the 
universities in societal change. In many ways, of course, a professional 
society represented an evolutionary social advance in the direction of 
greater rationality in human affairs, but at the same time the technical-
cognitive rationality of many professions came to be seen by many 
critical researchers as a threat to a deepening of democracy. In the long 
run the big universities have mainly developed as research universities 
for elites proving their excellence in different fields. University research 
has in many instances, and even more so lately, been geared more to 
the needs of big business than to the needs of people (even if there has 
been and is an ongoing struggle over that issue, and it also has to be 
said that a lot of research has created better living conditions for the 
masses). The mass universities/colleges have mainly developed to meet 
the vocational needs of general economic development, rather than to 
support the preconditions for a strengthening of democracy, even if 
citizenship education has figured prominently in the rhetoric. 
In the Scandinavian countries and the United States, pressure to 
develop general democratic capabilities among the growing genera-
tions has for many years been put mainly on the compulsory school 
system if anywhere at all, although only in recent years has this been 
in terms of communicative abilities and democratic virtues. In the light 
of rapid and far-reaching societal changes, such as changing conditions 
for communication, a growing need for reflexivity etc., together with 
the evolution of higher education into a mass education system aimed 
at producing a suitable labour force and faced with the pressures of 99
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an “academic capitalism” (Slaughter & Leslie 1997), we may ask 
what kinds of tasks are given priority in the higher education system. 
We may also ask what kinds of identities and citizenships are being 
“produced” by the university system and especially by the profession-
als educated there, with their “diffuse social responsibility within a 
collective system” (Parsons 1968, p. 536). 
One question that can be raised is whether the university should 
have a major role to play in developing “professional ethics and civic 
morals” (cf. Durkheim 1957/ 1992) or, to put it another way, should 
university studies be a kind of citizenship and moral education and if 
so, how? And what will the implications be when it comes to the higher 
education of professions that are situated in a field of force between 
the demands of profitability and the demands of developing “profes-
sional ethics and civic morals”? Will there be room for deliberation 
(Gutmann & Thompson 1996) even within these standard university 
and college courses leading to different professions? Will there be 
room for analysis of the often close relationship between facts and 
values, and for a view of knowledge as part of a commitment, for a 
“philosophy of knowledge”? Can the universities become public spaces 
for encounters between different cultures, different views of “how 
society works”, different views of “the good society” and different 
views of good professionalism?2 And lastly, how can we argue the case 
for such a development of higher education? I will start with the last 
question, approaching it from the tradition of seeing education as a 
citizenship right, and successively contextualize (higher) education in 
relation to the question of professional responsibility. 
Higher education for cultural responsible 
citizenship
Basic education is seen by the social theorist Thomas H. Marshall 
(1949) as a social citizenship right (regarding social rights as the 
third step in the development of citizenship rights, the first two be-
ing civil and political rights), by which he meant that it is “the right 
of the adult citizen to have been educated”. But to what level do we 
need to be educated, and how should that level and the character of 
education be decided? 
The search for cultural democracy and cultural citizenship through 
higher education may by many more be regarded as a fourth step, 
supplementing Marshall’s analysis of three forms of citizenship and 
citizenship rights. A cultural citizenship right could also be seen as an 
expression of the capacity to participate in the national and interna-100
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tional culture. Among leading social scientists who have developed 
these ideas one could mention Karl Mannheim in the 1920s (2000) 
and his “pedagogical optimism”, and Talcott Parsons in the 1960s 
(1966, 1971) and his analysis of the need for an “educational revolu-
tion”, in which he saw the universities as crucial in the evolution of 
modern societies, for example in their role of educating professionals. 
For Marshall and Parsons, however, the problem was primarily one 
of access to education and the function of the educational system 
in society as a whole, not so much a question of the “philosophy of 
knowledge” earlier raised by Mannheim and raised once again in the 
late 1960s and the 1970s during the culture wars of the universities 
and the questioning of the technical rationality of professionals. The 
culture wars clearly problematized the question of the content of 
university studies.
One way of developing Marshall’s theory of citizenship rights is 
put forward by Jürgen Habermas.3 In the discourse theory paradigm 
developed by Habermas (1996), rights to political participation are 
put centre stage. The perspective on citizenship rights which Habermas 
develops has many similarities to Marshall’s, but it differs mainly by 
stressing participation rights as the most fundamental. Like Marshall, 
Habermas makes a threefold division of rights and relates them to the 
liberal tradition in which individual autonomy is central. However, at 
the same time he focuses on the development of what he calls com-
municative rights, seeing those rights as bases for the rights to political 
participation: “Basic rights to equal opportunities to participate in 
processes of opinion- and will-formation in which citizens exercise 
their political autonomy and through which they generate legitimate 
law” (Habermas 1996, p. 123).
Habermas’s way of doing this is to see what Marshall calls civil 
rights – or negative freedom in Berlin’s (1950) vocabulary – as precon-
ditions for political participation, the political citizenship rights which 
are the most important for Habermas. In his first category of rights, 
Habermas differentiates between classical rights of freedom or equal 
individual rights, rights that protect citizens’ membership of different 
associations and, thirdly, judicial guarantees for these rights to be pro-
tected and realized. All these three together create the communicative 
rights (the first category of rights) needed for political participation. 
The argument for stressing participation as the most important right 
is the inner connection seen by Habermas between the sovereignty of 
the people (democracy) and (citizenship) political rights (the second 
category). Compared to the liberal tradition, which views the state 
as protector of individual civil rights, the Habermasian discourse 
perspective sees the (democratic) state as the medium and expression 101
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of the people’s collective will-formation. This connection also implies 
that the political autonomy of citizens is realized not only through 
general laws, but through discursive communication processes. The 
third category of rights, welfare rights and among them education, are 
important supplementary rights in Habermas’s perspective, in relation 
to what has been said about creating conditions for individuals/citizens 
to participate equally in these discursive communication processes 
and, more specifically, in political processes. 
The more precise role of the educational system in realizing these 
rights to participation remains somewhat unclear in Habermas’s work. 
An authoritative commentator such as Walter Reese-Schäfer (1995) 
stresses that the perspective put forward in Between Facts and Norms 
(Habermas 1996) “must, if one is analysing the potentials of change, 
lead to a development and nurturing of structures within the system 
of law and to an education of deliberative attitudes among the citizens 
who exercise this communicative power” (Reese-Schäfer 1995, p. 82, 
my translation).4 This position of Habermas can be further developed 
in relation to the liberal–communitarian spectrum. 
The liberal-communitarian debate and  
the question of developing deliberative virtues
Seen in the political philosophical perspective of the liberal–commu-
nitarian debate, the problem of the virtue of deliberation and politi-
cal participation can also be seen as a question of the (educational) 
relationship of each individual to society as a whole. In the early 
1980s, communitarian philosophers like Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) 
and Michael Sandel (1982) characterized liberal talk of human or 
natural rights as sheer fictions because it falsely purported to employ 
a moral reason that transcended historically situated communities and 
the substantive common goods that gave focus to the development 
and exercise of virtue. For them, such liberal talk merely obscured the 
amoral character of the liberal individual, who learned to see social 
cooperation as adherence to a contractual system of rules in which 
self-interest alone could motivate parties to enter into the contract. 
Moral education was thus seen as impossible within the ethos of 
liberal modernity and could only be renewed through a revival of 
communities.
From another, but parallel, angle, Bellah et al. in Habits of the 
Heart (1985) and The Good Society (1991) and William Sullivan in 
Reconstructing Public Philosophy (1986) were seeking for a renewal of 
civic philosophy. Unlike the liberal idea of a contract, which emphasizes 102
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mutual obligations within clearly defined limits, a civic covenant is a 
bond of fundamental trust founded upon a common commitment to a 
moral understanding. Civic moral education, for them, was natural in 
that it fulfilled humanity’s distinctive need to be at once self-reflective 
and yet interdependent members of a community.
Habermas’s discourse theory integrates fragments from both the 
liberal and the republican/communitarian traditions in the idea of 
an ideal procedure for deliberation. The implications of the theory 
for education are, as noted earlier, not explicit and Habermas can 
be interpreted in different ways. What can be said is that he places 
the realization of deliberative policy in the institutionalization of 
procedures, where an intersubjectivity on a higher level is expected 
to emerge; public discourses meet with a good response only under 
circumstances of broad participation. This, in turn, “requires a back-
ground political culture that is egalitarian, divested of all educational 
privileges, and thoroughly intellectual” (Habermas 1996, p. 490). 
Political autonomy cannot be realized by a person pursuing his or her 
own private interests, but only as a joint enterprise in an intersubjec-
tive, shared practice. In this respect, the deliberative project could be 
regarded as the continuation of the project of modernity.
What implications for higher education is it possible to see within 
this perspective? Of course they are not clear-cut, but I think that one 
obvious implication is a willingness to develop and also problematize 
the meaning of the “public good” of education in relation to the tradi-
tion of “private good” (cf. Englund 1994). In what perspective may 
we have to view the universities in order to fulfil the kind of aims that 
are related to the public good? Well, we need to look at higher educa-
tion and universities as public spaces for advanced mutual reflection 
and deliberation, and not primarily as predestined curriculum routes 
preparing people for different vocations and private careers (nor as 
providing an isolated liberal education in the classics). We also have 
to look at higher education as a possible place for mutual engagement 
where common inquiry and argumentation are important principles. 
And to what extent are and can the universities become public spaces 
for encounters dealing with controversial questions, for example 
between different cultures, different views of how society works and 
different views of the good society? The point is whether universities 
can recreate their selective traditions and dare to “institutionalize 
dissensus” and “make the university a site of public debate” (Delanty 
2001, p. 7). One clear example would be the possible development of 
professional education and how meanings of the “public good” and 
professional responsibility of this education can be problematized by, 
for instance, challenging the traditions of technical rationality. 103
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Another prominent commentator on the liberal-communitarian 
debate and also an important proponent of democratic education, 
Amy Gutmann (1987), called for a democratic education in schools 
and universities, noting that “learning how to think carefully about 
political problems, to articulate one’s views and defend them before 
people with whom one disagrees is a form of moral education to which 
young adults are more receptive and for which universities are well 
suited” (Gutmann 1987, p. 173). Later she put the question, together 
with Dennis Thompson, whether there will be room for fruitful discus-
sions of controversial issues, for deliberation – mutual and carefully 
balanced consideration of different alternatives – within standard 
university courses (Gutmann & Thompson 1996).
Later, Martha Nussbaum in her Cultivating Humanity (1997) as-
serts that the noble ideal of liberal education as a base for the cultural 
dimension has not been fully realized in colleges and universities, but 
rather subordinated to instrumentalism, to technical and vocational 
education. In her book, she sees the development of three capacities as 
essential: first, the capacity for critical examination of oneself and one’s 
traditions; second, the capacity to see oneself not simply as a citizen of 
some local region or group but also, and above all, as a human being 
bound to all other human beings by ties of recognition and concern; 
and third, the capacity for narrative imagination, which “means the 
ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person 
different from oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that person’s story, 
and to understand the emotions and wishes and desires that someone 
so placed might have” (Nussbaum 1997, pp. 10–11). 
Deliberative communication as a possible way?
In recent educational discussion on the democratic role of the edu-
cational system, the idea of “deliberative communication” has been 
brought into focus (Englund 2000b, 2006b). “Deliberative commu-
nication” stands for communication in which different opinions and 
values can be set against each other. It implies an endeavour by each 
individual to develop his or her view by listening, deliberating, seeking 
arguments and valuing, coupled to a collective and cooperative endeav-
our to find values and norms which everyone can accept, at the same 
time as pluralism is acknowledged. Current advocates of deliberative 
democracy stress the presence of different views or arguments, which 
are to be put against each other. Two or more different views on a 
subject are proposed by persons who confront each other, but with 
an openness in their argumentation. “While acknowledging that we 104
Tomas Englund
are destined to disagree, deliberative democracy also affirms that we 
are capable of deciding our common destiny on mutually acceptable 
terms” (Gutmann & Thompson 1996, p. 361). To the authors cited, 
deliberative democracy puts a particular emphasis on responsibility 
and consequences, implying that socialization to citizenship and the 
exercising of a citizenship must be in focus.
The meaning of deliberation as a term can be traced back to 
Aristotle and the Latin deliberare and libra, which mean “weigh” 
and “balance”. Historically, the word has been closely associated 
with the judicial process of carefully choosing between alternatives, 
and many different interpretations of it along these lines exist. There 
is also an obvious dimension of purposiveness in the concept, and it 
is in addition associated with accurate and responsible reflection. In 
the classroom setting, it is possible to evaluate which discussions are 
deliberative and which are not. 
Deliberative communication:  
Characterization and criteria for evaluation
In the following, I will combine ideas from Habermas and other 
philosophers and social scientists mentioned, such as Gutmann and 
Nussbaum, without examining any problems of underlying contra-
dictions arising from possible differences in the use of language and 
concepts. The characteristics of deliberative communication presented 
below can be further developed (and of course questioned) and used 
as a framework for a discussion of basic criteria for evaluation.5
Different views are set against each other and arguments for  a. 
these different views are given space and presented (cf. Habermas 
1987a, 1996, Gutmann & Thompson 1996).
There is tolerance and respect for the concrete other; participants  b. 
learn to listen to the other person’s argument (Habermas 1987a, 
1996, Benhabib 1992).
Elements of collective will-formation are present, in other words  c. 
an endeavour to reach consensus or at least to reach temporary 
agreements and/or to draw attention to differences (Habermas 
1987a, 1996, Gutmann & Thompson 1996).
Authorities/traditional views (represented, for example, by  d. 
parents and tradition) can be questioned and there are op-105
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portunities to challenge one’s own tradition (Gutmann 1987, 
Nussbaum 1996).
There is scope for students to communicate and deliberate  e. 
without teacher control, in other words for argumentative 
discussions between students with the aim of solving problems 
or shedding light on them from different points of view.
Deliberative communication compared  
to some similar proposals for higher education 
While the dominant tendencies in analysis of the role of today’s universi-
ties underline technical and scientific rationality, “the idea of excellence” 
and similar ideas that can be grouped under the umbrella of academic 
capitalism, there are also alternative metaphors, aiming for deliberative 
democracy as mentioned, critical professionalism (Barnett 1997), profes-
sional responsibility and civic professionalism (Sullivan 2005). University 
analysts like Readings (1996) and Delanty (2001) both point out the 
need for the university as a community of dissensus. Delanty briefly 
develops the dissensus idea, saying that “the point is to institutionalize 
dissensus and to make the university a site of public debate … that the 
central task of the university in the twenty-first century is to become a 
key actor in the public sphere and thereby enhance the democratization 
of knowledge” (Delanty 2001, pp. 7 and 9). 
The suggestion put forward in this paper on deliberative communica-
tion may be seen as one possible way to develop the general idea advanced 
by Delanty (which I do not find more fully developed in his own work 
or that of Readings). It stresses the need not only to deliberately address 
conflicts of different kinds in higher education, but also to reach agree-
ments, implying confrontations between different people even without 
the presence of a teacher. It also underlines the university as a public space 
where one’s private values and actions can be challenged, as well as ac-
centuating the necessary pluralist character of education. 
However, the idea of deliberative communication should be seen as 
a challenge (or to put it more cautiously, a supplement) not just to liberal 
education and traditional university courses, but also and perhaps more 
specifically to higher education programmes responsible for educating 
the future professionals of society. Will there be room for critical discus-
sions about multiple discourses on civic and professional responsibility 
within professional education courses (Solbrekke & Karseth 2006)? Can 
the idea of deliberative communication assume its proper place within 
professional education courses? And why should it?106
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Professional responsibility through professional 
education at universities? 
In many of his works, Durkheim elaborated on the need to develop 
professional ethics, civic morals and a moral individualism through 
education and other means. In his Professional Ethics and Civic Morals 
(Durkheim 1899/1957/1992), he argued that professional associations 
might help the wider society to develop new forms of civic morality and 
social solidarity through their propagation of values and their devotion 
to occupational craft and the development of a professional ethics.
In what way can we understand and apply his ideas to the present 
day? I will try to show how, even now, the analyses of Durkheim make 
sense of the relationship between higher education and the profes-
sions, and I will try to combine these analyses with Michael Walzer’s 
discussion in his Spheres of Justice (1983) of the roles of different 
(academic) professions in relation to different spheres. To begin with, 
it can be said, to quote Ronald Barnett, “that professionals are persons 
licensed to practise their trade” (Barnett 1997, p. 135), but this also 
means that “a professional is in authority, irrespective of any further 
authority she acquires as authority” (Peters 1967, cited from Barnett 
1997, p. 135). 
One of the starting points for Durkheim, and also for Walzer, is 
that the sphere of capitalist laws, profit etc. is not able to organize and 
solve a certain kind of problem in society, i.e. problems related to what 
can be called “the public good”, which the state has tried to solve by 
developing professions. Durkheim also believed that, in the economic 
sphere of social life, no professional ethic exists. However, the economic 
sphere and professions related to it will not be analysed in the following; 
the question that will be posed is concerned with the professions that are 
related to the public good, and especially with the role of higher educa-
tion in relation to such professions. Referring to an analysis undertaken 
by the American sociologist Steven Brint in his In an Age of Experts 
(1994), I will concentrate in particular on the relationship between higher 
education and what he calls a “social trustee professionalism”.
Social trustee professionalism
Steven Brint (1994), interpreting the question of professionals in 
modern society, stresses that professionals in the Durkheimian sense, 
as a source of collective moral force in public life, are becoming less 
important. He also argues that the professional sphere as a whole is 
shifting in character, from a “social trustee professionalism” to more 107
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and more of an “expert professionalism” (but let us remember that 
he is primarily talking about the United States). 
In general sociological terms and in relation to the research of 
recent decades on professionalism and professionalization (cf. note 2), 
it can also be said that in more and more occupations professionaliza-
tion strategies have been developed to achieve autonomy and authority, 
higher wages, specific privileges etc. (and there is a huge literature on 
that kind of professionalization process). All of those things may have 
become more important than the relationship of the professions to 
their ethics and their civic morals. This relationship is not dead, but 
the tension between what can be called professionalization (towards 
expert professionalism) and (social trustee) professionalism can be seen 
in many professions, for example teaching (cf. Englund 1996a).
Brint (1994) distinguishes in his analysis five different spheres of 
professions. Three of these I will not be touching on in the following: 
firstly, the business service sphere and professionals close to the market, 
for example financial analysts and corporate lawyers; secondly, the 
applied sciences sphere, made up of engineers and geoscientists among 
others; and thirdly a sphere which in a way is closer to the traditions I 
will consider here, the culture and communication sphere, which includes 
academics, journalists and media professionals. Here I shall concentrate 
on the two spheres which are closest to the tradition of functioning as 
a source of collective moral force in public life, in other words social 
trustee professionalism, and my question is whether professions within 
these spheres still can and are to be seen in this way, and what the role 
of the higher education of these professional groups is and could be. 
The two remaining spheres in Brint’s analysis, closer to the tradi-
tion of social trustee professionalism, are fourthly the civic regulation 
sphere, embodying judges, for instance; and fifthly, the human services 
sphere, made up of teachers, social workers, nurses and the like. Con-
sequently, three of the professions identified by Brint, namely lawyers, 
teachers and nurses, and the higher education of those professions, 
can be seen as examples of a social trustee professionalism. The fourth 
profession I will mention is that of the psychologist. 
Professional ethics and civic morals in today’s 
welfare state 
How can we understand the professional ethics and civic morals of 
lawyers, psychologists, teachers and nurses today, and what is the role 
of higher education in relation to these professions? What different 
kinds of moral mission – related to the sphere of professional ethics and 108
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civic morals – do the students in these different professional education 
programmes develop? More precisely, how do they view their (future) 
professional role in relation to the public or the common good and 
their role of “doing good for the other”? And in the same way, how 
does each professional education programme construct these roles? 
What would it be possible to do? Would deliberative communication 
be a possible model for developing a professional responsibility among 
these future professionals?
First, each profession has its specific history and its tensions. But 
some of the professions touched upon here, for example teachers and 
nurses, at least with regard to mass education and hospitals linked to 
citizenship as a social right (Marshall 1949), have historically been 
related to a kind of value rationality – to sentiments – which may 
gradually have changed into a scientific rationality in the context of a 
society ordered along functionalist lines (Parsons 1951, 1968), where 
science in different forms provided the basis for the profession. Later 
on, within what we can call a late or second modernity (Habermas 
1996), one could perhaps also discuss a more argumentative dimension 
to these professions, with science still playing a leading role (cf. Englund 
1986, 1989, 1996b)6. But what do these general changes imply for the 
principles of the public good and “doing good for the other” and for 
the professional education of the professions concerned?
Can a similar history be sketched out for professions such as 
lawyers? Well, that profession has had other historical links to power 
from ancient times on and in relation to more modern times. Like that 
of the psychologist, the legal profession is related more to a liberal 
society, with a one-to-one relationship of professional and client. The 
civil rights of (specific) citizens have formed a kind of base for this 
profession, and the education of lawyers, in turn, has been directly 
related to a set of laws and other judicial rules. 
Teachers and nurses, as I have said, are in turn more related to the 
citizenry with reference to education and medical care as social rights. 
So what we can see is that different professions, as Margareta Bertilsson 
(1990) has pointed out, can be understood in relation to the dynamics 
and inner tensions of the development of citizenship rights. Thus, as 
Bertilsson argues and I would be inclined to agree, there seems to be 
“an intrinsic relationship between professional power and citizens’ 
rights as constitutive of one another”, because in today’s society the 
professions “have become both client- and citizen-constitutive” (Ber-
tilsson 1990, p. 131). And, one could add, this is also a question with 
dynamic consequences, depending on how different citizenship rights 
are interpreted in (higher) education and in (educational) policy.7109
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The crucial role of higher education
As Sullivan (2005) notes, there are three clusters of values in pro-
fessional education: (1) the values of the academy, (2) the values of 
professional practice and (3) the ethical-social values of professional 
identity. This third set of values “emphasizes the professional’s integrity, 
sense of direction, and ability to assume responsibility for the quality 
of his or her own work and the standards associated with the field 
of practice. These values ground professional education in a broader 
conception of the purpose of the profession and the ideals to which it 
aspires, connecting training directly with the field’s social contract … 
this blending of the normative and the technical is of the essence of 
good work” (Sullivan 2005, p. 29). But, as Sullivan notes, it is also this 
third dimension of professional education that generally receives the 
least attention in the formal curriculum. As I understand the problem, 
this third set of values has to be integrated with the other two, first by 
giving ethical-social values a (more) prominent place within the acad-
emy and secondly by promoting encounters between professionals in 
practice and students in professional programmes – in concrete terms, 
by creating arenas in academia where representatives of these two 
groups meet each other for deliberations. Giving ethical-social values 
a more prominent place within academia is of course a challenge to 
the often rational courses, but this also has to be supplemented by the 
encounters mentioned: where and when professional practitioners can 
come back in to the university and where and when they can confront 
the students and of course the university teachers. 
By iterative deliberation over crucial issues, by mutual and care-
fully balanced consideration of different alternatives in professional 
education, students – from time to time together with professional 
practitioners – will be given opportunities to create, express and de-
velop their meanings, challenge each other’s meanings and perhaps 
also change their meanings, persuaded by the best argument. Through 
deliberative communication, students (and practitioners) will also be 
given the chance to develop their judgement and thereby learn that 
there are always different possible performative language settings and 
hence different ways of categorizing, in many cases with different con-
sequences, different evaluations and different interpretations, and that 
these situations have to be handled with professional responsibility.110
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Notes
1. Important steps in the early history of the views presented here are, first, 
ongoing work related to the Swedish journal Utbildning & Demokrati 9(1) 
(Education & Democracy) and especially its conference on “Higher educa-
tion, democracy and citizenship”, arranged in December 2000 with Martha 
Nussbaum as the keynote speaker. The papers from the conference are pub-
lished in English in Studies in Philosophy and Education 21 (4/5). Secondly, I 
would like to mention the symposium at the ASHE conference in November 
2002, at which four of the participants in the present journal issue (Englund, 
Karseth, Solbrekke and Öst) presented papers and collaboration between 
Norwegian and Swedish researchers on these issues formally began. Thirdly, 
the NERA conference in Copenhagen in 2003 and the symposium on The 
Normative Dimension of Higher Education, when all five of us presenting 
articles in this journal issue also were presenting papers in this symposium 
together with four other presenters. 
2. In using the term professionalism, I am focusing on what qualifications 
and acquired capacities, what competences, are required for the successful 
exercise of an occupation. The term professionalization is understood as a 
sociological project, relating to the authority and status of the profession, “a 
manifestation of the historical and social ambition of an occupational group 
to achieve status and a position in society” (Englund 1996a, p. 76). 
3. The German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas has for decades 
influenced the social sciences and political debate on many questions. Through 
works such as The Theory of Communicative Action I–II (1984/1987a), The 
Philosophical Discourse on Modernity (1987b), Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action (1990), Justification and Application (1993) and 
especially his Between Facts and Norms (1996), he has given us some basic 
starting points for an analysis of the relationship between society and educa-
tion within a perspective of normative rationalization, i.e. the transformation 
of the source of the sacred to communication as collective will-formation. In 
this perspective, what ultimately explains social integration is communicative 
and argumentative consensual processes. It is the good argument that creates 
validity, a validity that also has an integrative force. Habermas’s (1984/1987a) 
theory of communicative action, further developed into a model for delib-
erative democracy and a discourse theory of law and democracy (1996), 
is perhaps also the most developed and well-known theory of deliberative 
democracy (cf. Bohman & Rehg eds. 1997). His model is developed in rela-
tion to the liberal and the republican/communitarian traditions, and in his 
analysis he has emphasized the different citizenship concepts of these tradi-
tions. Habermas (1996) has also underscored how the usual dichotomized 
conceptualization around citizenship rights within these traditions “fail[s] to 
grasp the intersubjective meanings of a system of rights that citizens mutually 
accord one another” (p. 271).
4. For an interpretation of the role of education from that perspective, see 
Carleheden 2006 and Englund 2006a,b and further on in this article.
5. These five characteristics of deliberative communication were developed earlier 
in relation to an ongoing debate on the democratic role of the comprehensive 
schools in Sweden (Englund 2000a). The idea of deliberative communica-
tion, its sources of inspiration and its characteristics are further elaborated in 111
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Englund 2006b. There is one source of inspiration not mentioned earlier here, 
namely classical pragmatism, especially Dewey and Mead (cf. Englund 2000b), 
concerning which it can be said that pragmatism is an old name for some new 
ways of thinking (cf. Kloppenberg 1998).
6. In these works (Englund 1986, 1989) I am distinguishing three rationalities 
of education, a value rationality (patriarchal), a scientific rationality and a 
democratic rationality.
7. One example would be the ongoing discussion about how to understand 
basic education as a social right for each citizen in the making or as a civil, 
parental right (cf. Englund 1994). Another example would be the analysis 
of civil citizenship versus social citizenship, undertaken by Nancy Fraser and 
Linda Gordon (1994). 
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